Mali Conflict Sees Coordinated JNIM-FLA Attacks Kill Defence Minister and Dozens of Soldiers

In the Mali conflict, coordinated attacks by the JNIM-FLA coalition in April and July 2024 killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara, enabled temporary seizure of northern towns including Kidal and Tessalit, and resulted in the execution of at least 19 surrendering Malian soldiers, prompting calls for a war crimes investigation.

Recent Coordinated Attacks by JNIM-FLA Coalition

On 25 April the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched a series of coordinated attacks on several cities in northern, central and southern Mali. [1] This was the most ambitious operation by the armed groups since the outbreak of the Malian security crisis in 2012. [1] It led to Defence Minister Sadio Camara's death and enabled insurgents to seize the towns of Kidal and Tessalit in the north. [1] On 4 July the FLA-JNIM coalition replicated the synchronised offensive against six localities across the country. [1] Although the Malian Armed Forces contained most of the attacks, the insurgents seized part of Anéfis in the north, forcing the Malian Armed Forces and its Russian partner, Africa Corps, to entrench themselves in their military base. [1] After six days of intense fighting, the Malian Armed Forces and Africa Corps suppressed the offensive and retook Anéfis. [1] The events suggest that the FLA-JNIM coalition is part of a more structured form of operational complementarity. [1] The two groups pool their in-depth knowledge of the field and their local networks. [1] FLA is more active in the northern regions, while JNIM brings its experience in asymmetric warfare to the central, western and southern regions. [1] The al-Qaeda-affiliated group is also able to conduct complex, coordinated operations, such as on 1 July last year, when seven simultaneous attacks were launched in the west of the country. [1] At the same time, it was targeting the various economic corridors leading to Bamako to block or disrupt commercial traffic. [1]

July Convoy Ambush and Executions of Surrendered Soldiers

Amnesty International accuses warring parties of war crimes after Malian soldiers were executed outside combat in 2016. — Source: gdelt On 18 July a military convoy leaving Anéfis was ambushed by JNIM and FLA fighters, killing at least 50 soldiers. [2] Amnesty International analyzed videos from the July 18 attack on a military convoy leaving the northern town of Anefis. [2] The footage shows soldiers who were clearly out of combat, walking with their hands behind their heads before being shot execution-style. [2] Amnesty says the footage shows at least 19 soldiers who had surrendered being executed. [2] The rights group is calling for an independent investigation after analyzing videos from the attack. [2] Amnesty says international humanitarian law gives absolute protection to anyone who has surrendered or is otherwise out of action. [2] The United Nations has also demanded an investigation into the killings. [2] In 18 July, at least 50 military personnel were killed at Tabrichat, in northern Mali, when the army convoy was attacked by members of the JNIM coalition affiliated with Al Qaida and by Tuareg separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front. [4] Amnesty analyzed 12 video recordings in which Malian soldiers can be seen "with their hands behind their necks, in clear sign of surrender," and in another "a group of men on the ground and five armed individuals shooting at them." [4] These images also show "armed men mistreating prisoners, brutalizing them and beating them." [4] Amnesty called on Malian authorities to conduct an independent and impartial investigation into these war crimes committed by FLA and JNIM, which claimed the attack. [4] It appears clear that the soldiers were out of combat before becoming victims of mistreatment and execution. [4] Any person out of combat, including captured or surrendered soldiers, must benefit from the protection provided by international humanitarian law. [4] On 23 July the United Nations had already called for an investigation into the "acts of torture and murders" committed in that attack. [4]

Nature of the FLA-JNIM Operational Alliance

The FLA-JNIM alliance pools local knowledge and asymmetric warfare expertise, with FLA more active in the north and JNIM operating across central, western and southern regions, including complex coordinated operations and targeting of economic corridors. [1] The two groups pool their in-depth knowledge of the field and their local networks. [1] FLA is more active in the northern regions, while JNIM brings its experience in asymmetric warfare to the central, western and southern regions. [1] The al-Qaeda-affiliated group is also able to conduct complex, coordinated operations, such as on 1 July last year, when seven simultaneous attacks were launched in the west of the country. [1] At the same time, it was targeting the various economic corridors leading to Bamako to block or disrupt commercial traffic. [1]

Broader Pattern of Attacks Across the Sahel

{IMAGE_3} Similar increases in bold, coordinated attacks have occurred in Burkina Faso and Niger, reflecting a strategic reconfiguration of the terror threat that challenges state authority across the Sahel. [1] While the FLA-JNIM alliance is disrupting security in Mali, the increasing use of bold, collective attacks is also evident in the other two AES countries. [1] On 30 June Burkina Faso's armed forces announced that they had thwarted 'complex and coordinated' attacks by terrorist groups in the east and north of the country. [1] In Niger, the army repelled two attacks against Niamey's Diori Hamani International Airport. [1] The first, on 28 January this year, was claimed by Islamic State Sahel Province, and the second, on 18 June, by JNIM. [1] The increase in collaborative operations on several fronts, the targeting of strategic infrastructure, the use of increasingly sophisticated technologies (in particular commercial drones) and targeted assassinations of leaders reflect a strategic reconfiguration of the terror threat. [1] By showing governments' inability to protect their people, the armed groups are challenging the foundations of Sahelian states' authority and possibly creating conditions for their overthrow. [1] While a jihadist group is unlikely to take over a government in the short term, the risk cannot be ruled out. [1] Such a scenario would have major consequences not only for the Sahel but for West Africa and beyond. [1] The gradual expansion of armed groups into coastal countries, particularly northern Benin and Togo, as well as JNIM's disruptions of trade corridors, reflect the risks of terrorism becoming regionalised. [1] Repercussions could extend from security to trade flows and international interests. [1]

International Reactions and Calls for Cooperation

The attacks prompted statements of solidarity from ECOWAS, the African Union, neighboring states and international actors, but analysts urge concrete security cooperation measures including intelligence-sharing and revival of the Nouakchott Process. [1] The April attacks in Mali sparked a wave of official statements of support. [1] Several neighbouring states, including Senegal, Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco and Benin, condemned the attacks and reaffirmed their support for Mali. [1] The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union also denounced the violence and called for collective mobilisation. [1] Beyond Africa, the European Union, Turkey and Saudi Arabia condemned the attacks and reaffirmed their support for Mali's authorities. [1] The AU has however emerged as the main institutional source of support. [1] It was the only organisation that decried the 4 July attacks in Mali, and also condemned the January and June attacks in Niger. [1] Algeria, which has good relations with Niger, was the only neighbouring country to express its 'deep indignation' and full solidarity with the Nigerien government and people. [1] These expressions of solidarity are encouraging, but should be accompanied by more concrete engagement. [1] Several diplomatic developments could revive security cooperation across the region. [1] These include the recent rapprochement between Mali and Algeria, and between Niger and Benin. [1] Senegal has good relations with the AES countries and could use its presidency of ECOWAS and its role as chair of the ECOWAS Commission to improve security cooperation in the region. [1] Constructive engagements with the central Sahel states by Togo and Ghana are also significant, as is the strengthening of dialogue between the AU Commission and AES countries. [1] At least two levels of action should be prioritised to consolidate this dynamic. [1] First, the rapprochement between Algeria and Mali, and Niger and Benin, should be quickly translated into pragmatic security cooperation measures. [1] Re-establishing military coordination and intelligence-sharing mechanisms between security officers would help manage border incidents and cross-border threats, while reducing the risk of diplomatic crises. [1] Second, the AU, which has recently strengthened its engagement with AES countries, has a diplomatic window to broker dialogue, paving the way for a resumption of regional security cooperation. [1] Better relations between Bamako and Algiers also offer an opportunity to revitalise the Nouakchott Process, a cooperation mechanism for combating terrorism that the AU created in 2013. [1] The process brings together Algeria, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Senegal. [1] It could be expanded to include Togo, Ghana and Benin. [1] The AU could seek support for its regional peace initiatives from the United Nations under Resolution 2719, which authorises financing of peace support operations in Africa. [1] Preventing the Sahel from reaching a security tipping point has become a collective imperative for preserving stability across West Africa. [1]

Ongoing Security Crisis Since 2012

Since 2012, Mali has been the scene of a profound security crisis, marked in particular by violence from groups affiliated with the jihadist organizations Al Qaida and Islamic State, as well as criminal community groups and Tuareg separatist movements. [4] It adds to a serious economic crisis. [4] After two successive coups in 2020 and 2021, the country is led by the military who came to power with the promise of restoring security and preserving territorial integrity. [4] The attacks prompted statements of solidarity from ECOWAS, the African Union, neighboring states and international actors, but analysts urge concrete security cooperation measures including intelligence-sharing and revival of the Nouakchott Process. [1] The FLA-JNIM alliance pools local knowledge and asymmetric warfare expertise, with FLA more active in the north and JNIM operating across central, western and southern regions, including complex coordinated operations and targeting of economic corridors. [1]

What to watch next: The AU could seek support for its regional peace initiatives from the United Nations under Resolution 2719, which authorises financing of peace support operations in Africa, while better relations between Bamako and Algiers also offer an opportunity to revitalise the Nouakchott Process.