US Strikes Hit Iranian Bases and Nuclear Site as Tehran Fires Missiles at Gulf Targets

US and Iranian forces escalated military operations in the Gulf with fresh strikes and missile attacks, threatening the fragile MoU ceasefire and further disrupting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

Latest US and Iranian Strikes

Over the past 24 hours the confrontation entered its most dangerous phase since hostilities resumed last week, with both sides sharply intensifying military operations. Overnight the US carried out a fresh wave of precision strikes against military and petrochemical infrastructure across southern Iran, targeting facilities in the oil-producing Khuzestan province as well as sites around Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island and Bushehr. It employed aircraft, naval assets and sea drones to degrade Iran’s air defence, missile and coastal capabilities. Open-source imagery has corroborated damage to the Omidiyeh airbase and to a building within the Bushehr nuclear complex. [1]

Iran responded with ballistic missile strikes against facilities linked to US military presence in Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan, while simultaneously maintaining pressure in the Strait of Hormuz through anti-ship missile activity and continued interference with commercial shipping. These exchanges have further reduced vessel traffic through the waterway to single digits. [1] US Central Command struck Iranian drone launchers, missile networks and naval assets, notably on Qeshm Island and in Bandar Abbas. [3] Iran retaliated by firing projectiles against Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Oman. [3]

Dispute Over Strait of Hormuz Governance

These developments are unsurprising because the MoU was never intended to resolve the dispute that resulted in the conflict; instead it merely suspended fighting long enough for negotiations on the more difficult political questions to begin. One of the issues left unresolved by the MoU is the question of who will ultimately determine the rules governing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The controversy has stemmed from the language of the fifth clause, under which Iran undertook using its best efforts to ensure the safe passage of commercial vessels for an initial 60-day period while also committing to restoring normal traffic after removing military and technical obstacles. [1]

The clause stipulated that Iran would conduct dialogue with Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussions with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz. Washington has interpreted the reference to international law as reaffirming the longstanding principle of freedom of navigation through an international waterway. In contrast Tehran has placed greater emphasis on the reference to the sovereign rights of the coastal states, arguing that any future governance arrangement must recognise the authority and security concerns of the littoral countries particularly Iran. [1]

Military Equilibrium and Limitations

From the moment the MoU was signed both sides appeared to recognise that it represented a temporary pause rather than a permanent settlement. The US undoubtedly retains overwhelming superiority in precision strike capability, intelligence assets and long-range power projection, enabling it to target Iranian air defence systems, coastal military infrastructure, logistics facilities, missile sites and energy infrastructure with considerable effectiveness. Yet that military superiority continues to be checkmated by geographical constraints because Iran’s control of the northern coastline together with its deployment of mobile missile batteries, drones, fast-attack craft and coastal surveillance systems enables it to generate sufficient uncertainty to disrupt commercial shipping without matching American conventional capabilities. [1]

Iran has once again demonstrated its ability to impose costs rather than secure a decisive victory by complicating maritime traffic, threatening regional military facilities and sustaining asymmetric pressure across the confined waters of the Gulf. However Tehran cannot establish a stable maritime arrangement acceptable to the US, its Gulf neighbours and the international community. As a result what is being witnessed is an uneasy equilibrium in which one side possesses the ability to punish while the other retains the ability to disrupt, yet neither can escape the confrontation. [1]

Impact on US Munitions and Broader Deterrence

This escalation could further imperil already precarious US munitions stockpiles, threatening deterrence in other theaters such as the Pacific. The US expended roughly 32% of its estimated pre-war inventory of 3,100 Tomahawk missiles. The US used between 53% and 80% of its estimated 360 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense interceptors and between 41% and 61% of its estimated 2,330 Patriot interceptors. [3] Rebuilding those stocks will take time, as producing a Patriot PAC-2 or PAC-3 interceptor takes 15-20 months while replacing a Tomahawk cruise missile takes about 25 months. [3]

A conflict with China over Taiwan would consume substantially more US munitions, as penetrating China’s extensive air defenses would require large numbers of standoff weapons while defending against its missile forces would demand many interceptors. Even so, depleted stocks do not necessarily mean that US deterrence in the Pacific has collapsed, as the US retains largely untouched stocks of anti-ship missiles, submarine-launched torpedoes and stealth-delivered precision weapons capable of devastating Chinese maritime infrastructure. [3]

Economic and Commercial Consequences

The commercial consequences have followed almost immediately. Shipping companies have reduced transits through the Strait of Hormuz, insurance costs have risen and oil markets have once again begun pricing geopolitical uncertainty into global energy supplies, not because physical shortages have yet materialised but because prolonged uncertainty over the governance of the waterway itself introduces risks that markets invariably seek to anticipate. Alternative export infrastructure through Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may offset part of the disruption, but no existing network possesses the capacity to fully replace the Strait of Hormuz. [1]

What to watch next: Both sides have used the intervening weeks since the MoU to prepare for the contingency each believed was likely, with Iran restoring damaged infrastructure and Washington rotating forces and rebuilding strategic reserves.