UK’s Ownership Stake in Somaliland’s Berbera Port Sparks Concerns Over UAE Ties in Horn of Africa Turmoil
LONDON/BERBERA — The British government holds a co-ownership stake in Somaliland’s strategically vital Berbera port, which forms part of a UAE-dominated network of ports and airbases along the Gulf of Aden now facing intense scrutiny amid escalating crises in the Horn of Africa.
The port of Berbera, located in the self-declared republic of Somaliland, is jointly owned by Dubai Ports World (DP World), a UAE-based logistics giant, the Somaliland government, and British International Investment (BII), the UK’s development finance institution formerly known as CDC Group. This arrangement has come under renewed attention as regional tensions intensify, with allegations of Emirati backing for armed groups, including Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), casting a spotlight on the UAE’s expansive infrastructure footprint.
According to a report by Middle East Eye, Berbera serves as a key node in the UAE’s Gulf of Aden network, which includes ports and airbases under close examination for their role in regional power plays. The UK’s involvement through BII underscores London’s financial interests in one of Africa’s most geopolitically sensitive maritime hubs, even as humanitarian and security crises unfold across the Horn.
Ownership Details and Strategic Importance
Berbera port has undergone significant modernization since DP World secured a 30-year concession agreement with Somaliland in 2017. Under the deal, DP World holds a 51% stake, Somaliland retains 30%, and Ethiopia acquired 19% to secure vital Red Sea access amid its landlocked status. BII’s investment bolsters this partnership, providing capital for expansion that has transformed Berbera into a multipurpose facility capable of handling container traffic, oil, and military logistics.
The port’s location on the Gulf of Aden makes it indispensable for trade routes linking the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal. It has boosted Somaliland’s economy, generating revenue and jobs in a region long plagued by poverty and instability. However, its integration into the UAE’s broader logistics empire—spanning Berbera, the UAE-operated Assab port in Eritrea, and other facilities—has raised questions about Abu Dhabi’s influence in the area.
UAE Network Under Scrutiny Amid Regional Crises
The UAE’s regional infrastructure investments have drawn criticism for allegedly facilitating support to armed factions. In Sudan, where civil war rages between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF, Emirati ties to the paramilitary RSF have been a focal point. Reports from international observers, including UN panels, have documented UAE arms flows and logistical aid to the RSF, often routed through Gulf of Aden ports like Berbera.
While Berbera itself has not been directly implicated in Sudan shipments, its position within the UAE-controlled network amplifies concerns. The Middle East Eye article highlights how these facilities are “under scrutiny over Emirati support for RSF in Sudan,” linking them to broader Horn of Africa instability. This includes clashes between Ethiopian forces and Somaliland-backed militias, Somalia’s opposition to Somaliland’s de facto independence, and Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea.
Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991, remains unrecognized internationally but maintains functional stability compared to Mogadishu. Its port deal with Ethiopia—signed in January 2024—further irked Somalia, prompting threats of military action and straining alliances.
UK’s Role and Broader Context
BII, wholly owned by the UK government, positions its Berbera investment as developmental, aiming to foster economic growth and regional connectivity. The institution has invested over £200 million in the project since 2018, emphasizing job creation and infrastructure resilience. UK officials have defended such engagements as vital for countering poverty and extremism in fragile states.
Yet, the entanglement with UAE interests complicates the narrative. The UAE has emerged as a major player in the Horn since the 2010s, investing in ports, farms, and military bases to secure food supplies, trade dominance, and influence against rivals like Qatar and Turkey. Critics argue this has exacerbated local conflicts, with Somaliland caught between great-power competition.
The timing of the disclosures aligns with heightened global focus on Red Sea shipping lanes, disrupted by Houthi attacks since late 2023. Berbera’s expansion, including a new economic free zone and planned rail links to Ethiopia, positions it as a potential alternative to Djibouti’s congested facilities.
Implications for Regional Stability
As crises persist—ranging from Sudan’s war displacing millions to Ethiopia-Somalia border tensions—the Berbera port’s ownership structure highlights the intersection of commerce and geopolitics. For the UK, balancing development goals with associations to controversial actors remains a diplomatic tightrope.
Neither BII nor DP World has issued recent statements on the scrutiny, but Somaliland authorities continue to tout Berbera as a beacon of progress. Observers note that while the port drives revenue exceeding $300 million annually for Somaliland, its geopolitical baggage could invite further international pressure.
In a region where foreign powers vie for primacy, Berbera exemplifies how infrastructure investments can both stabilize and inflame tensions. As the Horn of Africa navigates ongoing volatility, the UK’s stake serves as a reminder of the long reach of Western capital in contested spaces.
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