Ukraine War Sees New Army Chief Appointed After Protests Oust Syrskyi
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky replaced army commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi with Mykhailo Drapatyi following widespread protests over Syrskyi’s leadership and the dismissal of reformist Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, amid ongoing Russian losses and diplomatic calls for new ideas to end the Ukraine war.
Leadership Changes in Ukrainian Command
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently made the controversial decision to dismiss Mykhailo Fedorov, his minister of defense. [2] Fedorov, admired both by Ukrainian troops and Western allies, was at the forefront of Ukraine’s increasing technological innovations in the war against Russia. [2] According to Fedorov, tension began to emerge over his own desire to replace General Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces. [2] Widespread protests over Syrskyi’s role in the conflict subsequently led Zelensky to remove him as well. [2] The surprise replacement of reformist minister Mykhailo Fedorov last week brought several thousand people to the streets demanding his reinstatement and the removal of army chief Oleksandr Syrsky. [3] Faced with the largest war-related protests since Russia’s 2022 invasion, President Volodymyr Zelensky sacked Syrsky on Tuesday and replaced him with Drapatyi. [3] Mykhailo Drapatyi, who was the reformers’ preferred candidate and is close to Fedorov, has been appointed as the new commander-in-chief. [5] Several days of demonstrations, and apparently pressure from the army, have changed everything. [5] Syrskyi stepped down as commander-in-chief after two and a half years. [5]
Ukrainian protesters demand reinstatement of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and removal of army chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. — Source: asiatimes
Reactions from Soldiers and Civilians
Ukrainian soldiers and civilians told AFP on Wednesday they welcomed the appointment of Mykhailo Drapaty as the new army commander in the fifth year of Russia's invasion, and they were still hoping for the return of a popular defence minister. [3] In Izium, a city 30 kilometres from Russian positions, a 22-year-old soldier who gave his military nickname Khrest said Syrsky’s departure was a “good thing” but still wanted Fedorov to return to government. [3] According to Khrest, Fedorov was lobbying for the widespread introduction of fixed-term contracts — a key demand by soldiers, many of whom are fighting without a set term, even though the war is in its fifth year. [3] “He’s introducing contracts so that mobilised soldiers at least know how long they’ll have to serve,” the soldier told AFP. [3] “And he’s also trying to make sure soldiers get some rest.” [3] Another soldier in Izium, nicknamed “Ananas”, also told AFP he was pleased to see the back of Syrsky, who was known for military success but also developed a reputation for not caring about losses. [3] The 30-year-old said Syrsky, a career officer who led the crucial defence of Kyiv in 2022, “threw a lot of people into the meat grinder at the start of the war”. [3] “I think he got off lightly by simply being dismissed,” Ananas told AFP. [3] The soldier also alleged Syrsky had been linked to a scandal over reports of violence against new recruits in the Skelia assault unit. [3] Syrsky, who also oversaw Ukraine’s successful 2022 counter-offensive in Kharkiv, called the violations “shameful” and said measures had been taken against those responsible. [3] Ananas said unless Fedorov returned, the discontent was likely to continue. [3] He praised the official — known for trying to enhance Ukraine’s drone technology — for trying to ensure that “fewer soldiers die and that drones fight in their place”. [3] “People like that should not be removed. They are doing the right thing,” he said of Fedorov. [3] Svitlana, 48, a nurse in an airborne assault unit, also saw the arrival of Drapaty — a respected “combat officer” — as “positive.” [3] She was grateful to civilians for protesting to oust Syrsky. [3] “I believe only civil society can influence these processes. While we are here defending rights, people went out and defended theirs,” she said. [3] She also valued the “digitalisation” led by ex-minister Fedorov, describing him as a “good manager”, but also warning not to “idealise” the young official. [3] During his tenure, “pay has started to decrease somewhat, and that affects our families”, she noted. [3] For 69-year-old Oleg in Kyiv, the removal of Syrsky was not enough. [3] “People got together to support Fedorov… the aim has not yet been achieved,” he said. [3] Oleg believes that Zelensky tried to “turn the attention” away with Fedorov’s removal and thinks that things could only change with a replacement “at the top” of government. [3] Taisiia Obod, a 21-year-old political science student, also hoped Fedorov would remain “within government” and that momentum for his “reforms and initiatives” would be maintained. [3]
Drapatyi’s Background and Priorities
Mykhailo Drapatyi served as commander of the Joint Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. [5] In spring 2024, he commanded the defence of Kharkiv region after Russia’s surprise attack near Vovchansk. [5] From November 2024 until June 2025, he was commander of the Land Forces. [5] He resigned after a Russian missile strike on soldiers in Sumy region, in which 12 people were killed. [5] He subsequently became commander of the Joint Forces. [5] Drapatyi agrees that victory is Ukraine’s only path. [5] Based on what he has said and done publicly, three things which, in Drapatyi’s view, can lead to achieving this goal have been identified. [5] The first is high-quality training for new soldiers. [5] The general has suggested that victory rests on people. [5] Even as commander of the Land Forces, his first interest was in training centres rather than the front. [5] However, Drapatyi was unable to reform the mobilisation system itself — a long-standing problem for the Ukrainian army that will not be easy for him to change even in his new role. [5] The second element in defeating Russia, in his view, is Ukraine’s technological advantage. [5] “He considers the mass use of FPV drones and the development of artificial-intelligence systems for reconnaissance and target destruction to be an area in which Ukraine currently has an edge over Russia, and one it must retain,” the Espreso TV website wrote. [5] Drapatyi would also like to change the culture within the Ukrainian army, which is fighting not only an external enemy but also an internal one: an outdated command system, corruption, bureaucracy, and a system in which commanders do not listen to soldiers or take responsibility for mistakes. [5] He had already sought to reform this system as commander of the Land Forces, but was unsuccessful, which was one reason why he left that position. [5] He also accepted responsibility for the deaths of 12 soldiers following a Russian strike on a training centre. [5] This is also why Drapatyi is among the most popular generals among soldiers, while several brigade commanders have also praised him. [5]
Context of the War of Attrition
Power struggles aren’t new to Ukrainian politics. [2] Zelensky replaced the previous commander-in-chief, Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi. [2] Similar to Fedorov, Zaluzhnyi was well-liked by Ukraine’s soldiers. [2] Zelensky’s removal of Fedorov and Syrskyi highlights an ongoing tension in Ukraine’s armed forces. [2] Western observers emphasize that Ukraine’s modern and technology-heavy approach in the war stands in contrast to Russia’s low-tech, industrialized approach. [2] However, Ukraine’s army is, in fact, a hybrid force that simultaneously needs the innovative approach championed in the West along with more brutal aspects needed in a war of attrition. [2] With such a hybrid approach, one factor of war becomes important beyond all others: morale. [2] When Ukraine gained independence in 1991, it inherited its armed forces from the Soviet Union, both in terms of equipment and personnel. [2] While Ukraine’s post-independence economic problems led to the degradation of its material assets, the country’s officer corps remained firmly entrenched in the old Soviet model. [2] Russia’s annexation of Crimea and de facto annexation of ports in the Donbas region of Ukraine forced Ukrainian leaders to re-evaluate their armed forces. [2] Specifically, there was a push to acquire western trainers and expertise to overcome Russia’s military advantages. [2] The Ukrainian army’s transformation was still under way when Russia invaded in 2022. [2] Critically, while much of the lower-ranked officer corps embraced western training, several senior officers, notably Syrskyi, preferred the older, more traditional Soviet approach. [2] The training provided by the West was critical in Ukraine’s initial successes in the war as lower-ranked and non-commissioned officers proved vital in blunting Russia’s offense. [2] Zaluzhnyi — himself trained in the post-Ukrainian independence era — encouraged and supported these initiatives. [2] By 2023, the conflict began to shift from maneuver warfare, where Western tactics excel, to one of attrition, causing problems for Ukraine. [2] Furthermore, the officers who made Ukraine’s tactics successful in 2022 were either promoted or killed in the conflict. [2] The ongoing war meant their replacements, although enthusiastic, could not be trained to the same standard. [2] International media outlets and pundits have emphasized the importance of Ukraine’s drone technology in the war. [2] It’s beyond question that drones play an important role in the conflict. [2] Zelensky and Ukraine have, in fact, leveraged Ukraine’s drone expertise to secure diplomatic wins. [2] What this assessment misses, however, is that drones cannot fully replace human beings in any conflict. [2] Over-emphasizing drones also falls into the common Western, and specifically American, view of warfare — that technology is the decisive element in war. [2] Zelensky, however, isn’t falling into this trap. [2] Yes, he emphasizes the role of drones because he knows doing so gets Ukraine attention in the global media. [2] Furthermore, given that Ukraine faces a protracted recruitment problem, any use of drones helps alleviate the burden on the Ukrainian people. [2] Drones are also a cheap way for Ukraine to compensate for delays by western partners to provide artillery, air defence and other urgently needed supplies. [2] But Zelensky also knows that the conflict in Ukraine is now a war of attrition. [2] In these kinds of wars, the ultimate winner is typically the state that maintains the will to fight the longest. [2] In this goal, drones are a supplementary, not vital, component. [2] Syrskyi lacks the charisma of his predecessor, Zaluzhnyi. [2] Furthermore, his strategy has often been described as unimaginative. [2] But he did have an advantage over Zaluzhnyi and Fedorov that initially made him vital to the war effort: he had no illusions about its nature as a war of attrition and was willing to sacrifice Ukrainian lives for long-term strategic goals. [2] This pragmatic and brutal outlook suggests problems for Ukraine’s war effort. [2] Syrskyi’s willingness to pay for strategic goals with Ukrainian lives made him less popular with the troops than his predecessor. [2] This was ultimately what led to the protests against him that caused Zelensky to remove him. [2] Zelensky isn’t perfect. [2] He has made several mistakes during the conflict and even before it began. [2] That Ukrainians currently trust Fedorov to a greater extent than Zelensky after his dismissal raises the specter of a political rival in the future. [2] Zelensky does, however, recognize that war is ultimately a political act. [2] There is a place for dissident opinions, but if they undermine the strategic goals of the political leadership, they become problematic. [2] For a while, Syrskyi’s brutal approach served Zelensky’s and Ukraine’s goal of winning a war of attrition. [2] That’s why Zelensky initially chose to maintain him over Fedorov. [2] Once the public’s disdain for Syrskyi became evident, however, Zelensky sacrificed him to maintain both his position and, more importantly, the support and morale of the Ukrainian people. [2] In a long war of attrition, after all, morale is of absolute importance. [2]
Ukrainian soldiers and civilians welcome new army chief Mykhailo Drapatyi. — Source: bangkokpost
Diplomatic Efforts and Russian Losses
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that new ideas are needed to achieve peace in the Russia-Ukraine war and break the deadlock in negotiations. [1] The US secretary of state said that new ideas needed to be put forward for discussion in order to reach an agreement to end the war, as the proposals made so far had been "not acceptable to Ukraine at the time". [1] "I don't think it'd be acceptable to them either; in fact, probably less acceptable to them," the US secretary of state said. [1] In his view, if peace is achieved, "it'll be because of some new idea and some new concepts". [1] "We're prepared to offer some of those in the right setting and form if the opportunity presents itself and the conditions are right. We're prepared to play that role in a positive way," Rubio added. [1] Earlier the same day, Rubio said that during a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in the Philippines, he had discussed the need to end the war against Ukraine. [1] Russia has lost 1,460 soldiers killed and wounded over the past day. [4] The total combat losses of the Russian forces between 24 February 2022 and 23 July 2026 are estimated to be approximately 1,434,690 (+1,460) military personnel. [4]
Challenges Ahead for New Command
It is not yet clear whether Fedorov will return as defence minister, nor what lies ahead for Syrskyi. [5] Drapatyi has said little publicly. [5] As the Espreso TV website wrote in a lengthy profile, he avoids interviews and rarely comments on social media. [5] This year, he commented on events only twice, both times when Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed people whom the general supported. [5] Most recently, it was Fedorov. [5] Rather than merely issuing orders, he listened to their views, welcomed feedback and asked how he could help them. [5] A common criticism from brigades throughout the war has been that the general staff does not provide sufficient support to units defending the front line, or that it does not have a complete overview of the battlefield situation and issues orders without adequately taking the situation into account. [5] One of the first things he will do is ask the commanders of operational groups what they need and ensure that they receive proper support from the general staff. [5] This will have an immediate positive effect. [5] Drapatyi is a critic of Soviet-style thinking and micromanagement. [5] He wants to give individual commanders at the front greater freedom. [5] Unlike Syrskyi, at 43, he is a general who has “grown up” in the war against Russia, which has effectively lasted for 12 years since the annexation of Crimea. [5] Officers who went through the Anti-Terrorist Operation — as Ukrainians called the fighting in Donbas from 2014 onwards — have become generals in recent years and will now take up the highest positions. [5] Meanwhile, those who served in the Soviet era are gradually stepping aside. [5] It will be a genuine смена элит, a changing of the elites. [5] The Ukrainian analytical account Tatarigami wrote that he was “the best possible choice”. [5] “I would not expect immediate changes and improvements. It will take some time for the changes to become apparent. But I know that many soldiers have regained hope for change, and that is very important for morale,” he wrote. [5] “Thank you to the president for this difficult but incredibly good decision. The army will change. I believe it,” wrote Serhii Flesh Beskrestnov, a drone expert and former Fedorov adviser. [5] According to analyst Myroshnykov, Drapatyi will face five main challenges: mobilisation, a potential Russian mobilisation within two to three months, gaining a strategic overview of the front, building communication with everyone from scratch, and ending the provision of false information. [5] Several people say that expectations of him are high, but that he needs time to make changes — and will not have much of it. [5]
What to watch next: It remains to be seen whether Fedorov returns as defence minister and how Drapatyi addresses mobilisation and false reporting while building communication across the front.
