Houthis Kill 14 Yemen Government Troops in Attack South of Hodeidah
Houthi Attack Kills 14 Yemen Government Troops
Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels killed 14 troops in an attack south of the port city of Hodeidah. [1] A military official aligned with the country’s internationally-recognized government told AFP on Sunday that pro-government forces had repelled the attack in Hays district, south of Hodeidah, in clashes lasting for several hours at dawn on Saturday. [1] The official added that fighting resulted in dead and wounded among Houthi ranks, without specifying the number killed in the opposing force. [1]
Background on Yemen's Long-Running Civil War
The Houthis have been at war with the government since 2015 in a conflict that has killed hundreds of thousands of people and triggered a major humanitarian crisis in Yemen. [1] The rebels control Yemen’s capital Sanaa and much of the north, including Hodeidah on Yemen’s western Red Sea coast, while the internationally-recognized government holds much of the south. [1] The fighting between the two sides has largely been frozen since a UN-negotiated truce in 2022. [1]
Houthi Threats Against Saudi Arabia
On Friday the Houthis threatened airports and vital assets belonging to Saudi Arabia, a key backer of Yemen’s Aden-based government. [1] The rebel group, part of Iran’s axis of resistance against Israel and the United States, accused the kingdom of trying to stop an Iranian plane from landing. [1]
Red Sea Cargo Vessel Attacked by Unknown Assailants
A cargo vessel triggered a distress alert stating that it was under attack by unknown armed assailants off Yemen’s Red Sea coast. [4] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations centre reported that the ship had reported being under attack by unknown armed assailants. [5] The incident is under investigation with no further details on the vessel or damage yet. [5] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack as of Sunday afternoon. [5] Yemen's Houthi rebels have threatened to begin attacking ships again, though there is no report of them having started carrying it out. [5] Somali pirates have been active further away in the Gulf of Aden recently as well. [5]
Leaked Files Reveal Sinwar's Pre-October 7 Strategy With Hezbollah
Documents regarding the ties between the Hamas and Hezbollah terror organizations, analyzed by researchers at the Amit Terrorism and Intelligence Research Institute, shed light on the manner in which Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar saw cooperation with Hezbollah in the years leading up to the October 7th Massacre. [2] The documents show that Sinwar was not content with just one scenario, but presented Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah with several alternatives for possible attacks on Israel, assuming that each one would be conducted jointly with other members of the regional axis. [2] According to the documents, Sinwar also proposed more modest scenarios, in which Hezbollah and other actors had only a partial involvement. [2] However, even in those scenarios, there was one constant principle: Sinwar viewed the Jordanian border as a primary front in a future war, not just Lebanon and Gaza. [2] As early as June 2022, according to the documents, Sinwar sought to push a scenario where guerrilla forces would invade Israeli territory from both Syria and Jordan. [2] As far as he was concerned, increasing the arenas of battle would make it difficult for Israel to deal with the campaign and burden it with threats from several directions simultaneously. [2] The correspondence between the two terrorist leaders shows that Nasrallah took the proposals positively. [2] He said that it was a realistic scenario that can be realized. [2] He added that he intends to propose the matter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to receive his approval. [2] That being said, none of the scenarios that Hamas and Hezbollah discussed involved Iran's direct involvement, and the Islamic Republic was meant to be left out of the fighting. [2] The correspondences show, according to the analysis, that Sinwar's confidence grew with each meeting. [2] He got the impression that Nasrallah was prepared to join an extensive conflict, and that Hezbollah was ready to take a significant role in the war when it began. [2] A year later, in June 2023, Sinwar convened Hamas’s political bureau in Gaza and presented his updated assessment. [2] During the meeting, he said, In recent months, we have succeeded in bringing Hezbollah and the Iranians out of their psychological deterrence mindset that has existed since 2006 in the Dahieh. Now the Iranians and Hezbollah are prepared. [2] According to the documents, his remarks reflected his belief that both actors had become more willing to join a broader conflict with Israel. [2] Sinwar’s assessment remained unchanged in the following months. [2] In August 2023, about six weeks before the October 7th attack, he addressed Hamas’s Shura Council and expressed even greater confidence that his plan would succeed. [2] We are certain that if the great strategic battle breaks out, God willing, many fronts will be opened against this enemy, he said during the meeting. [2] At the same time, however, Hamas’s own intelligence apparatus offered a more cautious assessment. [2] An internal military intelligence document warned of a psychological barrier within Hezbollah. [2] According to the document, the Lebanese group harbored doubts about joining a large-scale war, presenting a more nuanced picture than the one Sinwar conveyed to Hamas’s leadership. [2] Despite those internal warnings, Sinwar reportedly did not change his view. [2] The documents indicate that he remained convinced Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah would join the fighting once the offensive began and would honor the understandings discussed between the sides. [2] According to the report, at 6:29 a.m. on October 7th, as the attack began, Sinwar sent a letter to Nasrallah apologizing for not informing him in advance of the exact timing of the assault and urging him to join the fighting immediately. [2] We ask for support and assistance, he wrote, later calling on Hezbollah to hurry and take part in concentrated rocket bombardments and begin a major ground offensive. [2] The report suggests that in the opening hours of the attack, Sinwar sought to rapidly expand the conflict to the northern front, expecting Hezbollah to launch a significant offensive alongside Hamas. [2] According to the analysis, events unfolded differently than Sinwar had anticipated. [2] Although he appeared convinced that Nasrallah would stand by him at the outset of the war, the expected support did not materialize in the initial hours. [2] Hezbollah joined the fighting only a day later and, according to the report, its involvement remained relatively limited rather than the large-scale offensive Sinwar had envisioned. [2] The analysis concludes that the gap between Sinwar’s expectations and the actual course of events is particularly evident in the internal discussions and correspondence preceding the attack. [2] While Sinwar believed the offensive would almost automatically trigger additional fronts, that scenario did not fully materialize. [2] The report concludes that the October 7th attack was a massacre and an unprecedented failure, but argues that had Hezbollah entered the conflict in the manner Sinwar had planned and hoped for, the scale of the events could have been far greater. [2] According to that assessment, Hezbollah’s decision not to launch a major offensive at the outset of the war prevented a much broader assault on communities in the Galilee. [2]
Ukraine Intensifies Strikes Turning Crimea Into Logistical Trap
In the last month Ukraine has intensified attacks on Crimea, targeting bridges, roads and other transport infrastructure objects as well as air defense systems, radar stations, energy facilities and fuel depots. [3] In June alone, 31 air defense systems and radar stations were hit according to Ukrainian statements. [3] The attacks have caused power supply interruptions and added difficulties for the Russian grouping on the peninsula in resource provision. [3] Analysts assess that such actions have forced some Russian units on the southern direction to focus on defense instead of active offensive operations. [3] The geographic position of occupied Crimea makes it a valuable military object but also a vulnerable target. [3] At the beginning of the full-scale war Ukraine’s capabilities to strike Crimea were limited by available weaponry. [3] Now Ukrainian forces state they possess means capable of substantially complicating the military situation for Russia. [3] Former commander of the US Army in Europe, retired Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, considers that today on the peninsula there are practically no fully safe objects left. [3] In Crimea there is nowhere to hide. Ukrainians are capable of striking any place where air defense assets, logistical centers, airfields or headquarters are located, he stated. [3] After strikes on ships and cessation of ferry service, Russian troops have become more dependent on a limited number of land routes and bridge crossings that regularly become targets of new strikes. [3] The situation has taken on the character of constant confrontation: the Russian side restores damaged infrastructure while Ukrainian forces continue to deliver repeated strikes. [3] Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War Kateryna Stepanenko notes that Russian military forces are increasingly using drones and interceptor drones to patrol important routes in the south. [3] At the same time, existing measures are insufficient. [3] They need a more mobile air defense system that will allow more effectively reducing the consequences of Ukrainian strikes, the expert emphasized. [3] Ukrainian commanders expect Russian troops to adapt but stated that they in turn will change their tactics. [3] Adaptation may take days, weeks or months, but we constantly find new ways to deliver strikes in any direction, at any depth, using any resources available to us, said Artem Belenkov, chief of staff of the 412th Brigade of Unmanned Systems of Ukraine. [3] Although the attacks have forced Russian troops in some areas to take a defensive position, military analysts warn that weeks or months may be required to reduce Russia’s combat capability to such an extent that it may have to retreat from positions in southern Ukraine. [3] At the same time, the weakened energy system of Crimea has exposed the systemic vulnerability of the peninsula. [3]
What to watch next: Further reports on the investigation into the Red Sea cargo vessel incident and any resumption of Houthi ship attacks, alongside continued Ukrainian strikes on Crimean infrastructure and Russian adaptation efforts.
